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Abstract. Scholarship has increasingly acknowledged the importance of public attitudes for shaping the
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Economic sanctions emerged as one of CFSP’s
central tools. Yet despite the emergence of sanctions as a popular instrument in the EU foreign policy
toolbox, public attitudes towards sanctions are yet to be studied in depth.This article explains public support
for EU sanctions, using the empirical example of sanctions against Russia. It looks at geopolitical attitudes,
economic motivations and ideational factors to explain the variation in public support for sanctions. The
conclusion suggests that geopolitical factors are the most important, and that economic factors matter very
little. Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism play an important role in explaining the support for sanctions
at the individual level.
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Introduction
What factors influence how Europeans think about economic sanctions? Is thinking
about it only purely reflecting economic interests, or do Europeans think in terms of
geopolitics too? Answering such questions is crucial to understanding public support
for sanctions as one of the key instruments of European foreign policy. For at least a
decade, scholars have acknowledged the importance of public opinion for formulating
the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (Faust & Garcia 2014;
Irondelle et al. 2015; Oppermann & Höse 2007; Oppermann & Viehrig 2009). Scholars
have also noted a growing tendency in the EU (and elsewhere) to use sanctions as a default
tool to respond to any kind of adverse development (Giumelli 2013b). By one account,
57 per cent of all post-Second World War sanctions were imposed since the 1990s (Morgan
et al. 2014). The sanctions became popular even though their effectiveness is debatable
(Drezner 2011; Portela 2014). The academic debate about the utility of sanctions ranges
from those opposing sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft (Pape 1998) to those who
cautiously argue in their favour (Drezner 1999), and those who proclaim their success
(Miller 2014).
Every sanctions regime has its opponents and proponents. Existing research has thus far
attempted to analyse the pros and cons of each side, or settle the dispute about sanctions’
effectiveness. What is missing in these debates is an attempt to explain the variation in
attitudes towards sanctions.Sanctions, as a tool of coercive diplomacy,engage public opinion
on different levels. As they are, fundamentally, a coercive tool against the target country,
sanctions are related to geopolitics. However, sanctions also influence trade exchange with
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the target and hence trade interests are relevant too (Drezner 1999, 2003; Drury 2001). But
sanctions can be also seen as a form of punishment (Nossal 1989), and indeed, previous
research has related preferences for the use of the tools of coercive diplomacy to societal
norms (Portela 2015; Wagner & Onderco 2014). However, research has not attempted to
engage the variation at the individual level using public opinion data. Existing research has
studied either special interests mobilisation in the face of sanctions (McLean & Whang,
2014), or used experimental designs to gauge the effects of perceived effectivity of such
tools (McLean &Roblyer 2016), but not in the European setting. This article aims to fill this
gap by explaining why individual Europeans differ in their approval of sanctioning Russia
for its actions in Ukraine. At the same time, the article makes a wider case about European
attitudes towards sanctions.
The dispute about how to respond to Russia’s actions in Ukraine has divided European
countries, and the European population. In particular, the question of whether to use
sanctions as a response towards Russia has attracted numerous critics among European
leaders, as well as among the European population. In December 2015, Italy opposed
the extension of sanctions against Russia in the meeting of the EU ambassadors before
the European Council meeting (Burchard & Eder 2015) and, as Radio Free Europe
reported, other countries were in the same camp as Italy (Jozwiak 2015). Slovakia’s
Prime Minister Robert Fico, for example, also called on the removal of the sanctions,
claiming that ‘the sooner they are removed, the better’ (Slovak Spectator 2016). The
disagreement also runs within the European public: As Pew Research recently reported,
European publics are divided about the sanctions against Russia. While 49 per cent of
Poles support the sanctions, only about 30 per cent of Italians and less than 25 per cent
of Spaniards do (Simmons et al. 2015). While the sanctions have been widely credited
with making a significant dent in Russia’s economy, and contributed to the country’s
economic woes, the debate over whether the sanctions actually influenced (or have a
potential to influence) Russia’s actions fits well with a wider debate about the utility of
sanctions.
This article builds on existing research into drivers of coercive behaviour in international
relations at the individual and societal levels to explain the variation. It looks at the
importance of geopolitical, economic and ideational factors for explaining attitudes
towards sanctions. In particular, the article looks at the relevance of Euroscepticism
and anti-Americanism in explaining the variation in attitudes, controlling for economic
situation, partisanship and social norms.While Euroscepticism has been a staple in the study
of European integration, looking at Euroscepticism as a determinant of other attitudes not
directly related to theEU is novel.The article uses public opinion data from theTransatlantic
Trends Survey (TTS) collected in June 2014 in ten European countries. The timing of the
collection – after Russia seized Crimea and fomented upheaval in the Eastern Ukraine,
but before the downing of the airliner MH17 – allows an analysis of these attitudes before
Europeans developed strong emotional positions on the issue. At the time, the EU had
only modest sanctions against Russia in place, which included travel bans and asset freezes
against 33 individuals, but no other sanctions against Russia were adopted (Council of the
European Union 2014). The conclusion offered in this article is that Eurosceptic individuals
and those with anti-American attitudes are more likely to oppose the sanctions against
Russia.
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Geopolitics, trade and ideas
Sanctions have emerged as the response of choice to foreign policy crises. The EU has at
present no less than 40 sanctions regimes, and many of them are applied in cooperation
with other partners, chief among them being the United States (Dreyer & Luengo-Cabrera
2015). Despite the importance of sanctions for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), the determinants of public attitudes on the use of sanctions are yet to be
explored in depth. One of the pioneering works in this area is by Clara Portela (2015), who
studied why the EUMember States resist sanctions. Building on the theoretical framework
of Saurugger and Terpan (2015), Portela argues that Member States’ resistance is due to two
factors: financial and social capacity to resist; and cognitive distance between norms defined
at the EU level and those at the level of the national administration. These two factors,
she maintains, ‘hold the most explanatory power’ (Portela 2015: 60).However, these factors
explain what Member States’ national administrations do – they do not look into what the
citizens think.
I broadly conceptualise the reasons why individuals can have different attitudes towards
sanctions along three lines: (a) geopolitical factors,which capture attitudes towards sanctions
based on seeing them as a tool towards advancement of a certain agenda; (b) economic
factors, which capture attitudes based on economic calculations and impact; and (c)
ideational factors, which capture attitudes based on an understanding of sanctions as a
normative response to a certain action.
Geopolitical factors
Russia’s dissatisfaction with the status it has been accorded in Europe (particularly in
Central and Eastern Europe) has been widely considered to be one of the reasons
why it decided to occupy Crimea and stir trouble in Eastern Ukraine (Allison 2014;
Mearsheimer 2014; Tsygankov 2015). The expansion of the EU and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the former Soviet sphere of influence, and attempts to
include Ukraine in a partnership agreement with the EU, are cited among the reasons. The
geopolitical considerations therefore include attitudes towards the EU as well as attitudes
towards the United States as NATO’s main military muscle.
Within the EU, citizens vary in both their assessment of the EU and in their assessment
of the United States. Existing research has noted a drop in popular support for European
integration among Europeans, which can be attributed to the financial crisis (Armingeon &
Ceka 2014;Hobolt &Wratil 2015; Kuhn & Stoeckel 2014; Streeck 2013). It has been argued
that the response to the financial crisis in Europe did not benefit the usual benefactors
of European integration, who in turn became less supportive of European integration.
Historically, those who had the opportunity to benefit themost fromEuropean integration –
the better educated and individuals with higher socioeconomic status – supported it themost
(Gabel 1998;Gabel & Palmer 1995). Simultaneously, the EU has, in response to the financial
crisis,becomemore supranational,which has led to a decrease in support among citizenswho
care about the risk the EU poses to their identity (Kuhn & Stoeckel 2014). Armingeon and
Ceka (2014) argue that the crisis increased the proportion of those who are disillusioned
with politics in general – whether European or national.
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Individual attitudes towards the EU can influence attitudes towards sanctions in general
in a number of ways. As sanctions represent a costly policy (exacerbated further by the
budgetary squeeze inMember States), individuals who hold a negative view aboutEuropean
integration, because of its costliness,may hold negative views about the sanctions. Similarly,
decisions about sanctions are taken at the supranational level and Member States have to
comply with them. This places the EU’s decision making directly at the heart of a foreign
policy dispute. Individuals may oppose the sanctions because they strengthen European
foreign policy at the expense of national foreign policies. At the same time, citizens with a
positive evaluation of the EU are already more likely to appreciate supranational responses
to complex issues abroad, and may be more likely to support multilateral sanctions.
Therefore, it is hypothesised:
H1: The higher the individual support for the EU, the higher the support for the
sanctions.
The second hypothesised geopolitical factor influencing attitudes towards sanctions is
anti-Americanism. The opposition to American unipolarity, including the expansion of
NATO and missile defence, which Vladimir Putin denounced at the Munich Security
Conference in 2007 (Putin 2007), has been described as Moscow’s main source of concern.
Indeed, Moscow has positioned itself in opposition to Washington and argued that it is
not Russia, but the United States, that has attempted to re-draw spheres of influence in
Europe. Here, Putin’s defences tap into anti-Americanism in Europe, widespread also in
the countries that are formally allied with the United States (Katzenstein & Keohane
2007; Williams et al. 2012). Russia attempts to portray its actions as being opposed to the
United States which reshaped unilaterally its own sphere of influence (Allison 2014). At
the same time, the United States has, at times, also been seen as pushing the EU towards
its own sanctions on Russia. European politicians, including the Commission President
Juncker, have argued that the EU should develop a different approach from that of the
United States, which emphasises sanctions and isolation. ‘We can’t let our relationship with
Russia be dictated by Washington’, Juncker has said (EurActiv 2015). This would not be the
first time that anti-Americanism has influenced how Europeans feel about world politics.
Earlier research demonstrated that anti-Americanism was a dominant feature responsible
for shaping Europeans’ attitudes towards the war in Iraq (Everts & Isernia 2015; Isernia
2005). The fiasco in Iraq led to even higher scepticism about American power among the
European publics.
One of the main reasons why individuals hold negative views of the United States
is because the country is seen as overbearing and hypocritical (Johnston & Stockmann
2007; Katzenstein & Keohane 2007). Individuals with such views may reject the sanctions
because they see them as a predominantly American strategy of dominance to bring
another country into the fold. On the other hand, individuals with pro-American views
are more likely to see the benefits of American influence in the world. Seeing Russia as
countering that influence (even using military force), individuals may support the use of
sanctions.
H2: The more positive the individual view of the United States, the higher the support
for sanctions.
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Endogeneity concerns
Both Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism may be due to other variables – in
methodological language, they may suffer from endogeneity. Attitudes towards the United
States can be conditioned by attitudes towards Russia. Using the old Cold War logic,
individuals with a negative view of the United States may hold a positive view of Russia
(and vice-versa). Therefore, one may need to control for attitudes towards Russia.
Similarly, part of the anti-Americanism in Europe is due to opposition to American
militarism. Kagan (2002: 10) famously argued that Americans are from Mars and
Europeans are from Venus, and ‘Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly
understandable aversion to the exercise of military power’. It therefore makes sense to
control for militarism among Europeans when studying attitudes towards the United
States.
Finally, yet importantly, individuals’ opinion of foreign policy (such as relations with
the EU, the United States, Russia, or sanctions) may depend on attitudes the individuals
hold towards their own government. Individuals who distrust their government tend to
develop views critical of the country’s existing foreign policy (Baum & Nau 2012) and be
more critical of European integration (Armingeon&Ceka 2014).Similar results were found
outside the EU, too: citizens trusting their government tend to have more positive attitudes
towards regional cooperation (Schlipphak 2014). Trust in national government is therefore
potentially endogenous and needs to be taken into account.
Economic factors
The theory of economic liberalism argues that bilateral trade mitigates the propensity of the
two states to engage in war (Nye 1988; Russett & Oneal 2001). Particularly in democracies,
the fear of loss from trade should prevent the countries from adopting confrontationist
policies because they are likely to restrict economic welfare (Gelpi & Grieco 2003, 2008;
Papayoanou 1996). Liberals have argued for a long time that commercial exchange leads to
the establishment of security communities through peaceful exchange; social transactions
happen,which fostersmutual responsiveness and develops trust (Deutsch et al.1957;Russett
& Oneal 2001). As Buzan (1993: 341) argues, ‘trade automatically creates pressures for
codes of conduct that facilitate the process of exchange and protect those engaged in it’.
Wendt (1999) argues that economic interdependence is one of the ways to shape identity
and influence state preferences. Given that sanctions function similarly to conflict as they
impact bilateral trade flows and decrease general welfare (Hufbauer et al. 1997), and that
this is more strongly the case as the scope of sanctions increases (Caruso 2003), we can
foresee that the influence of trade on sanction attitudes will be similar.
It may be therefore hypothesised that the higher the bilateral trade between Russia and
any given country, the less supportive of sanctions the citizens of that country will be. In fact,
the estimates made by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research in Vienna put the cost
of sanctions at the ballpark figure of €100 billion, and sanctions are expected to threaten
2 million jobs in Europe (Eigendorf et al. 2015). Countries with strong relative economic
ties with Russia, such as Slovakia and Italy, have been calling on the EU to lift sanctions
(Gaffey 2015).
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H3: The larger the bilateral trade between an individual’s country and Russia, the less
support there is for sanctions.
A secondary way in which economic factors can influence support for sanctions is
individual economic well-being. Among Western Europeans, the financial crisis which
started in 2008 and the subsequent crises provided a most costly economic condition.
Austeritymeasures,adopted in thewake of the crises,have squeezedEuropeans’welfare and
led to widespread dissatisfaction. It has been argued that expansion of trade is needed for
Europe’s economic recovery. If the sanctions on Russia are seen as economically damaging
(as has been already argued above), then individuals may reject them because the sanctions
are seen as further squeezing those already burdened by the impact of the financial crisis.
H4: Individuals in the countries hit by the crisis will be less willing to support financial
sanctions.
Ideational factors
A growing body of literature argues that foreign relations have become an aspect of
domestic contestation (and hence politicised) and that politics doesn’t end ‘at the water’s
edge’ (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012;Kriesi 2016;Milner & Tingley 2015;Zürn 2014).Existing work,
focusing on the role of political partisanship, has demonstrated that right-wing governments
are more likely to initiate disputes (Arena & Palmer 2009; Palmer et al. 2004). On the other
hand, Mello (2014) has found that left-wing parties have consistently abstained from the
Iraq War.
Rathbun (2004) and Schuster and Maier (2006) have shown that left-wing governments
prefer non-violent settlement of disputes and conflict resolution.This can be extended to the
study of individual preferences for sanctions. If left-wing parties are more likely to support
non-violent means of conflict resolution, then individuals with left-wing beliefs should be
more likely to also oppose the use of sanctions, whereas those on the right should be more
likely to be in favour of the sanctions.
H5: Individuals with right-wing views are more likely to support sanctions compared
to those with left-wing views.
At the same time, we should also consider other aspects of national culture beyond
partisanship. Early scholars of sanctions have noted that ‘the desire to punish will always
be an integral factor in their imposition’ (Nossal 1989: 320).Other scholars have argued that
indeed, punishment and isolation are the correct way to interpret the purpose of the EU
sanctions (Giumelli 2013a).This is in linewith the criminological literature,which underlines
that punishment is a society’s way of sharing the victim’s suffering and discouraging others
from committing similar actions (Banks 2013).
Building on insights from liberal constructivism that studies how domestic norms are
applied in foreign policy (Katzenstein 1978; Risse et al. 1999), existing research has shown
that domestic ways of dealingwith norm-breaking have an important influence on how states
deal with norm-breaking internationally. Criminologists have argued that countries vary
in the way they deal with norm-breaking. The variation in those responses can be placed
on a continuum from rehabilitative to exclusionary cultures (Garland 2001). Rehabilitative
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cultures highlight that social engineering can prevent crime, and that the individual offender
needs to be understood (including their motivation) so that future norm-breaking can be
prevented. On the other hand, exclusionary culture originates in understanding that the
punishment for crime is just and deserved.Norm-breakers are seen as different by their very
nature, and therefore sympathising with them – as suggested and argued by the proponents
of the rehabilitative culture – is seen as inacceptable.
Previous research has shown that countries with punitive domestic criminal systems are
more likely to be confrontationist towards countries breaking international norms (Wagner
2014;Wagner & Onderco 2014), and that democracies still exercising the death penalty are
more likely to engage in militarised interstate disputes (Stein 2015). Similarly, support for
the death penalty has been associated with higher support for war in Iraq or for the torture
of terrorism suspects (Liberman 2006, 2007, 2013).
It may therefore be hypothesised that individuals from EU Member States with more
punitive domestic cultures of dealing with norm deviance will be more likely to support
the imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas individuals from EU countries with a
more rehabilitative culture of dealing with norm deviance will be more likely to oppose the
imposition of sanctions.
H6: The more punitive the domestic culture of dealing with norm-breaking, the higher
the likelihood of supporting sanctions against Russia.
Methods and data
A question can be raised whether insights from an inquiry into public opinion on sanctions
on Russia are generalisable to the whole population of sanctions cases. In some way, every
sanctions episode is a unique one, and questions about whether comparative study of
sanctions is possible have been around since the advent of the field (see Eriksson 2010).
As Eckert et al. (2016: 10) note in the context of the UN, ‘each sanctions case is unique with
incomparably complex dynamics’, and over-generalisations are possible. At the same time,
the debate about the utility of sanctions against Russia is not too dissimilar to the debates
about the utility of sanctions against Iran, or North Korea, or Belarus. Studying the case
of sanctions on Russia provides a mixed blessing in this respect. While sanctions on Russia
provide a case with a high enough profile that the public has a chance to make up its mind
(which may not be the case when sanctions on Belarus are discussed, for example), an
individual’s choice may be influenced by other considerations, which is why the model used
in this study controls for additional variables.
The data for this article comes from the TTS, conducted by Taylor Nelson Sofres
(GermanMarshall Fund of the United States/Compagnia di San Paolo di Torino 2014).TTS
is an annual survey of public opinion in selected countries, and asks respondents a series of
questions related to international security. The survey is used widely in academic and policy
literature to study public opinion towards issues of international security (Everts & Isernia
2015; Everts et al. 2014; Faust & Garcia 2014; Isernia 2005). The data for this article comes
from the 2014 wave, completed in June 2014, and covers ten European countries (France,
Germany,Greece,Italy, theNetherlands,Poland,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,UnitedKingdom),
with a sample size of approximately 1,000 per country.
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Dependent variable
The support for sanctions against Russia is measured by a question asked within a battery
of questions about the crisis in Ukraine. The survey asked respondents: ‘There have been
a number of proposals for how (the EU/USA) should react to Russian actions on Ukraine.
For each of the following, please tell me if you agree or disagree with the proposed actions –
Impose stronger economic sanctions onRussia.’1 The respondents could answer by choosing
from a four-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Disagree strongly’ to ‘Agree strongly’.2 As stated
above, the question was asked at a time when the sanctions against Russia were limited in
scope and included only travel bans and asset freezes against 33 individuals (Council of the
European Union2014). Additional sanctions were not adopted in the EU until July 2014.
The high-profile case limits the generalisability of insights from the present analysis.
Despite controlling for possible endogenous factors, it is possible that the attitudes towards
sanctions against Russia stand out from general attitudes towards sanctions. Despite the
tests reported in Endnote 1, the present data provides only a limited study to explain more
generally individual attitudes towards all (or any) sanctions regimes established by the
EU. The highly-publicised nature may provide a scope condition for the argument. Further
research should address this shortcoming.
Independent variables
Geopolitical factors
Measuring Euroscepticism is not easy. In this study, I make use of a survey item asking the
respondents to answer the question ‘Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat
favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable opinion of the European Union?’,
with the answers being reversely recoded from ‘Very unfavourable’ to ‘Very favourable’.This
question seems to capture directly individual attitudes towards the EU.3 With the exception
of Greece, in all countries a larger part of the population held a favourable or somewhat
favourable view of the EU.
Similarly, anti-Americanism has been measured by the question ‘Please tell me if you
have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable
opinion of theUnited States?’.Previous research has shown that this wording of a question is
a reliable and valid way of capturing attitudes towards theUnited States andmeasuring anti-
Americanism in particular (Isernia 2005). Again, in all countries except for Greece, more
than 50 per cent of the population held a (somewhat) favourable view of the United States.
Addressing endogeneity4
As discussed above, Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism may suffer from endogeneity.
To address the possible endogeneity, I control for a number of variables. To control for
the attitudes towards Russia, I look at the answer to the question ‘Please tell me if you
have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable or very unfavourable
opinion of Russia?’. The data has been reversely recoded. To capture militarism among
Europeans, it is useful to look for readiness to use military power in other situations. Iran’s
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nuclear programme, and the chance of using force against it, has been high on the agenda,
as well as many discussions about the utility of such a strike. To capture general militarism,
I look at whether the respondent chose ‘favoured using force against Iran’.5 To capture the
level of trust in national government, I look at the responses to the question ‘Do you approve
or disapprove of the way [COUNTRY’S] government is handling international policies?’,
which included ‘Approve very much’, ‘Approve somewhat’, ‘Disapprove somewhat’ and
‘Disapprove very much’.
Economic factors
Bilateral trade between each country and Russia is measured as the total of imports and
exports between the two countries as a share of each country’s total trade. The data is taken
for 2013 from UN COMTRADE (2014). Individual economic experience of crisis has been
measured with a survey question asking ‘And regarding to the extent to which of you or
your family has been personally affected by the current economic crisis, would you say that
your family’s financial situation has been …’, with answer possibilities including ‘Greatly
affected’, ‘Somewhat affected’, ‘Not really affected’ and ‘Not affected at all’.
Ideational factors
Partisanship is measured with the help of a survey item that asked the respondents ‘In
politics, people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on
a scale from 1 to 7, where “1” means the extreme left and “7”means the extreme right?’.
The domestic culture of dealing with norm-breaking is measured by prison population per
1,000 inhabitants. A high relative prison population indicates that the country’s criminal
law privileges exclusion over re-integration. Prison population is a better measure than,
for example, retention of the death penalty. The death penalty is retained only by a few
countries (and none in the EU), and is therefore too crude an indicator. As criminologists
have argued, prison populations ‘are largely unrelated to victimization rates or to trends in
reported crime’ (Lappi-Seppälä 2011: 308), and is ‘a matter of political choice’ (Morgan &
Liebling 2007: 1107). The data has been obtained for the year 2014 from Walmsley (2016).
In addition to the variables described above, I control for education, age and gender.
Individuals with higher education have been found to be more in favour of free trade,
and therefore may be expected to be opposed to sanctions as a tool that limits trade
(Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006). Women have been found to be more opposed to military
action and other confrontationist moves, as well as more ‘sensitive to humanitarian
objectives’ (Eichenberg 2003: 137).
Model
Four models are estimated using logistic models using both individual- and country-level
data, with standard errors clustered at the country level. The data on bilateral trade with
Russia and on the domestic culture of dealing with deviance are measured at the national
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Figure 1. Agreement with imposition of sanctions on Russia.
level; all other variables are measured at the individual level. In the analysis, individuals are
nested within countries, making the data purely hierarchical.
The first model estimates a logit model using individual-level variables with country
fixed effects to control for country-level variation. The second model replicates the first, but
controlling for the variables discussed above as potentially endogenous. The third model
uses a hierarchical logistical model to estimate the effect of trade with Russia; whereas
the fourth model uses the same method but estimates the effect of the domestic culture
of dealing with deviance. I split these two because the small number of country clusters
(only ten) makes it almost impossible to make any statements about country-level factors if
multiple variables are used simultaneously.
Results
Before inspecting the quantitative models, it is worthwhile to look at the distribution of
support for stronger sanctions against Russia. As Figure 1 demonstrates, there is a wide
variation between individual countries in popular support for sanctions on Russia. The two
countries with the lowest support for sanctions on Russia are Greece,where only 35 per cent
of the population supports stronger sanctions on Russia; and Germany,where 46 per cent of
the population supports further sanctions. On the other hand, in Sweden and Spain, 73 per
cent of the population supports further sanctions, while the proportion rises to 83 per cent
in Poland.
Figure 2 shows the bivariate relationship between the geopolitical variables attitude
towards theUnited States and theEUand support for the sanctions onRussia at the national
level.For presentational purposes, I look at dichotomised versions of variables related to the
support for sanctions,as well as variables related to opinion about theEU/US.The individual
C© 2016TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Researchpublished by JohnWiley&SonsLtd.on behalf ofEuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch

































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
EU Support
Actual values Linear fit
Figure 2. Support for United States/European Union and sanctions.
Note: Actual values plotted represent national averages.
dots represent national shares of supporting sanctions or holding a favourable opinion
about the EU/US. As can be seen, there is a very strong bivariate relationship between
having a positive view of either the European Union or the United States and supporting
sanctions.
Moving to multivariate statistics, as expected, those with positive views of the EU
are more likely to support the sanctions on Russia, confirming thus the first hypothesis
(Table 1). Individuals with a positive view of the EU are up to 39 per cent more
likely to support sanctions against Russia, ceteris paribus. The second hypothesis is also
confirmed: individuals with a positive view of the United States are much more likely to
support sanctions. Looking at the tests using all four levels of response (reported in the
Online Appendix), an interesting phenomenon emerges: whereas there is no statistically
distinguishable difference between individuals with a very negative and somewhat negative
view of the EU, in the case of theUnited States, all three levels of the variable are statistically
significant.This suggests that there is a very strong difference between those holding strongly
unfavourable,anti-American views and the rest of the population.Even controlling for other
factors that may be endogenous to the relationship between the geopolitical variables and
support for sanctions does not diminish the effect. Expectedly, individuals who trust the
government with foreign policy are more likely to support the sanctions against Russia.
Similarly, individual militarism is related to the support for sanctions. Finally, as expected,
individuals with a positive view of Russia are significantly less likely to support the use of
sanctions (about 66 percentage points, ceteris paribus).
Moving on to the economic factors, the individual experience of the crisis had only a
weak effect on the support for sanctioning Russia. This curious result, combined with no
statistically significant effect of the trade with Russia, can be interpreted individuals not
considering the impact of sanctions on their economic wellbeing as being too strong (or not
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Table 1. Results of quantitative analysis
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Favourable EU opinion 1.34*** 0.07 1.39*** 0.08 1.39*** 0.08 1.39*** 0.08
Favourable US opinion 1.38*** 0.08 1.39*** 0.09 1.40*** 0.09 1.40*** 0.09
Crisis impact 1.11 0.07 1.14* 0.07 1.14* 0.07 1.13* 0.07
Partisanship
Extreme left 0.74* 0.10 0.82 0.11 0.82 0.11 0.82 0.11
Left 0.79* 0.07 0.83 0.08 0.84 0.08 0.84 0.08
Centre-left 0.90 0.06 0.91 0.06 0.91 0.06 0.91 0.06
Centre-right 0.83* 0.06 0.83* 0.06 0.83* 0.06 0.83* 0.06
Right 0.77* 0.08 0.73** 0.08 0.74** 0.08 0.73** 0.08
Extreme right 1.03 0.15 1.03 0.16 1.03 0.16 1.03 0.16
Age
25–34 1.25* 0.14 1.33* 0.16 1.33* 0.16 1.33* 0.16
35–44 1.29* 0.14 1.33* 0.15 1.33* 0.15 1.33* 0.15
45–54 1.15 0.12 1.17 0.13 1.17 0.13 1.17 0.13
55–64 1.00 0.10 1.09 0.12 1.09 0.12 1.09 0.12
65+ 0.86 0.09 0.94 0.10 0.94 0.10 0.94 0.10
Education
Secondary 1.01 0.07 1.02 0.07 1.02 0.07 1.02 0.07
Post-secondary 0.94 0.06 0.96 0.06 0.96 0.06 0.96 0.06
Gender 0.81*** 0.04 0.89* 0.05 0.89* 0.05 0.89* 0.05
Trust in government 1.39*** 0.08 1.39*** 0.08 1.40*** 0.08
Militarism 1.69*** 0.09 1.69*** 0.09 1.69*** 0.09
Favourable RU opinion 0.34*** 0.02 0.34*** 0.02 0.34*** 0.02
Trade with Russia 0.09 0.51
Culture of control 2.14* 0.70
Constant 0.65** 0.09 0.48*** 0.07 1.24 0.38 0.50 0.20
Panel-level variance 0.24** 0.11 0.15*** 0.07
N 7,805 7,520 7,520 7,520
AIC 9491.68 8664.33 8695.78 8691.63
BIC 9679.66 8872.09 8855.06 8850.91
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors reported in the second column. Reference
categories: partisanship (Centre), age (18–24), education (Primary); gender (Female). Country fixed effects
not reported for brevity. Exponentiated coefficients reported.
considering it all all). Individuals may be generally unaware of the trade sensitivity towards
other countries, or do not consider it as a limitation on foreign policy.
When it comes to the ideational factors, H5 is only partially and weakly confirmed:
compared to those with centrist views, those with left-wing views and right-wing views are
less likely to support sanctions, but the effect is not statistically distinguishable at all levels
and is rather weak. Interestingly enough, individuals who identify themselves as to be on
the ‘right’ are rather strongly opposed to sanctions; they are up to 27 percentage points
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less likely to support sanctions, ceteris paribus. The weak effect on the left may be due to
the fact that effect of partisanship is more nuanced than earlier theorised, and needs to be
studied further.6 Individuals from countries with more punitive domestic cultures are more
likely to support sanctions against Russia. This not only confirms the results of the earlier
research, but also suggests that the analogous thinking about responses to norm-breaking
domestically and internationally is likely. The result also confirms previous research by
Liberman (2013, 2014) and Onderco and Wagner (2015).Wagner and Onderco (2014) also
found that domestic punitivity is related to the likelihood of support for punitive action
internationally. While the survey data do not permit further analysis, the result underlines
the need for further research into individuals’ drivers of punitivity in Europe,where research
is still in its infancy.
As for the other control variables, the results are mixed. Younger individuals aged
between 25 and 44 seem to be more in favour of sanctions. The effect of education is not
statistically significant, but men tend to be statistically significantly less likely to support
sanctions.
Conclusion
This article set out to explain the variation amongEuropeans’ attitudes towards sanctions on
Russia.As sanctions have gradually become the predominant tool in the EU’s foreign policy
toolbox, exploring public attitudes towards them has become an obvious but overlooked
lacuna in the EU foreign relations scholarship. While the earlier scholarship has amply
focused on the impact and success of the EU’s sanctions (Dreyer & Luengo-Cabrera 2015;
Giumelli 2013a; Portela 2014), the attitudes of the population towards this tool of foreign
policy has been overlooked. This is curious as the existing scholarship studied attitudes
towards other tools of the EU’s foreign policy, including military cooperation (Irondelle
et al. 2015) and democracy promotion (Faust & Garcia 2014).
I have proposed that the attitudes towards sanctions can be shaped by geopolitical,
economic and ideational factors. Geopolitical factors under study included Euroscepticism
and anti-Americanism. The result of the multivariate analysis confirms this expectation:
individual attitudes towards the EU and the United States do influence support for
sanctions. This result is important as it suggests that Europeans, despite the charges of
having ‘forgotten’ geopolitics and being focused on their material well-being, consider the
geopolitical actors who promote sanctions. This result also suggests that individuals are
more likely to support sanctions if they see the EU or the United States more positively,
but sanctions against Russia are opposed by those who hold Eurosceptic or anti-American
views. As the new Eurosceptic parties are distinguished by their rather positive view of
the Kremlin, the result is not so surprising. This result also suggests that the impact of
Euroscepticism goes beyond the narrow remit of the evaluation of the EU: if the EU is the
symbol for supranationalism, then Euroscepticism can be reasonably expected to influence
other areas of supranational cooperation.
Economic factors matter, surprisingly, very little; the exposure to economic crisis does
not influence the support for sanctions, as is the case with bilateral trade. In the case of the
ideational factors, the situation is more mixed: partisanship is not strongly related to any
position on sanctions. But the national culture of dealing with deviance matters. Individuals
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from countries that are more punitive towards norm-breakers are more likely to support the
use of stronger sanctions against Russia.
These findings open new avenues for future research. The case of sanctions against
Russia provides a high-profile sanctions episode,which is a mixed blessing.On the one hand,
individuals have an better chance to create an opinion. On the other hand, the factors that
shape attitudes towards such a high-profile casemay not explain attitudes towards the whole
universe of EU sanctions episodes. Given the increasing politicisation and contestation
of foreign policy in Europe (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Kriesi 2016; Zürn 2014), studying
the structure of underlying conflicts will be important for future research. As economic
statecraft tools in Europe (such as the currently negotiated TTIP agreement, or indeed
other sanctions regimes) are becoming an object of domestic political struggle, we need to
understand more about what motivates individual attitudes. Furthermore, the research also
needs to look at the further effects of Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism in Europe, as
well as the dynamics of development of these phenomena. The results of this study suggest
that their influence for European politics may be wider than previously thought.
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Notes
1. Unfortunately, to the best of author’s knowledge, there is no survey that looks at public approval of
multiple sanctions regimes – which would be an ideal source of data for this survey. The 2014 TTS asked
about the preferred option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. One of the options presented
was ‘economic sanctions’, and individuals with positive attitudes towards the EU and/or towards the
United States are more likely to select this option over the option ‘accept that Iranmay develop a nuclear
weapon’, when Model 1 is replicated – essentially mirroring the present results. However, the nature of
the question is rather different from the one about Russia and therefore not reported here.
2. For this question, as for the subsequent questions, the responses were recoded into binary (disagree
v. agree; unfavourable v. favorable). For robustness purposes, all tests were re-run with the original
responses, and no major differences were found. The results can be found in the Online Appendix.
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3. For robustness purposes, I replaced with this question with another, asking: ‘Generally speaking, do you
think that [COUNTRY]’s membership in the European Union has been a good thing or a bad thing for
[COUNTRY]?’ Results are largely the same, and are reported in the Online Appendix.
4. Possible concerns about the endogeneity, raised by the EJPR reviewers, led me to use a mediation
analysis on the basis of model 1 (Imai et al. 2010; Hicks & Tingley 2011). In the analysis, I used the
attitudes towards Russia as a mediating variable, while attitudes towards the EU as a treatment factor.
The results confirm that attitudes towards Russia are an important factor, but results with regard to other
independent variables remain largely the same.
5. The survey also asks two questions. The first is: ‘As you may know, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons are under way.Which of the following do you think is the best option?’ The second is a
follow up: ‘And now imagine that all of these non-military options have been tried and the only option
left to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is the use of military force. In that case, should the
European Union take military action against Iran, or should it simply accept that Iran could acquire
nuclear weapons?’ I code as favouring military action all individuals who answered ‘Take military action’
to either of the two questions, but the results are robust to the replacement to those who answered so
only to the first question.
6. As one of the reviewers helpfully suggested, theEuropean left was one of themain drivers of the sanctions
against apartheid in South Africa.
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